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ABSTRACT 
 
After thirteen years of discussion and three revisions, China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was promulgated on August 30, 2007 
and has come into effect on August 1, 2008. It is the first anti-
monopoly law in China and has been viewed as an “economic 
constitution” and a “milestone of the country’s efforts in promoting 
a fair competition market and cracking down on monopoly 
activities.” However, the wording of some provisions of the AML, 
including the sections dealing with Intellectual Property (IP) 
protection, is not very clear. And juridical interpretations and more 
specific implementing regulations on the AML have not yet 
appeared. This has led to a lot of uncertainty for the operations of 
foreign enterprises, particularly IP related enterprises in China. 
This iBrief will provide an overview of possible impacts of the AML 
on the IP protection and commercialization in China. First, it will 
provide a brief overview of the AML, including both major 
compliments and criticism. Second, it will examine both 
opportunities and potential legal risks of foreign IP holders and 
investors when operating in China, particularly focusing on the 
impacts of Article 55, the IP-related provision. Thirdly, it will 
provide some practical suggestions and strategies for foreign IP 
holders and technology-driven companies to operate in China, such 
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as some useful defenses for potential IP lawsuits. Finally, it will 
provide some suggestions for future interpretation and 
implementation of Article 55 in the AML by drawing on lessons 
from the experiences of the United States and the European Union. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The interrelationship between intellectual property and anti-trust 
law has been one of the central issues in international intellectual property 
debates for many years. Intellectual Property (IP) law grants a monopoly 
that enables rights holders to prevent others from commercializing products 
or services that make use of their IP.2 In doing so, rights holders can 
exclusively explore their IP for a period of time, and thereby justify and 
recoup “their often substantial investment in research and development” of 
their products or services.3
¶2 However, IP laws and competition laws also have certain common 
aims, particularly in terms of promoting innovation and enhancing 
consumer welfare.
 By contrast, anti-trust/competition law is 
designed to stop monopolistic conduct and to safeguard a fair competition 
order of the market. 
4 IP laws have been based on the premise that limited 
monopoly rights will enhance innovation, progress of science, and public 
welfare. 5  IP laws enable Intellectual Property  Rights (IPR) holders to 
exclusively explore the market value of their IP for limited times so rights 
holders can recoup their investment cost, thereby incentivizing further 
innovation. Without effective IP laws, widespread piracy will reduce the 
value of investment of IP holders and result in “slower rates of economic 
progress and reduced consumer welfare.”6
                                                     
2 Kirstie Nicholson & Zirou Liu, Avoid competition problems in China, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., July/August 2008, 
 Competition and anti-trust laws 
have been based on the premise that competition is the “best way to ensure 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1968516/Avoid-competition-problems-in-
China.html. 
3 James F. Rill & Mark C. Schechter, International Anti-trust and Intellectual 
Property Harmonization of the Interface, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 783, 783 
(2003). 
4 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTI-TRUST 
ENFORCEMENT & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITION 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [hereinafter 2007 
Report].   
5 See U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (explicitly empowering Congress “to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
6 Rill & Schechter, supra note 3, at 783.  
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that consumers and other users receive maximum innovation and quality at 
the lowest possible prices.”7
¶3 It is therefore possible for IP rights to exist within the permitted 
boundaries of competition laws; however, when IP holders’ actions go 
beyond the legitimate IP protection, competition concerns may arise.
 
8 Thus, 
it is important to strike a sound balance between IP protection and fair 
market competition in order to make IP laws and anti-trust laws work 
collaboratively to achieve their legislative goals (that is, enhancing 
innovation, consumer protection, and pubic welfare). This is particularly 
true in the current globalized knowledge economy. On the one hand, overly 
strong IP laws may limit competition and lead to monopoly prices, which 
may limit the public’s access to IP assets. This will not only limit the 
public’s capability of making further innovation, but also have negative 
impacts on the progress of sciences and the sustainable growth of the 
national economy.  On the other hand, overly strong competition laws may 
restrict the protection and exercise of IP rights. This may limit the 
distribution of IP products and services, and have negative impacts on IP-
related international trade, and, ultimately, the “rate of progress toward 
creation of a single global economy.”9
¶4 This paper will focus on the newly enacted Chinese anti-monopoly 
law and its impacts on both IP protection and the operations of IP-relevant 
foreign enterprises in China. China has nearly one-quarter of the world’s 
population, and it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 
China’s GDP rose to $7.099 trillion in 2007, and China’s economy became 
the “second-largest economy in the world after the U.S.”—as measured on a 
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.
  
10
¶5 After thirteen years of discussion and three revisions, China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML) was promulgated on August 30th, 2007 and came 
into effect on August 1st, 2008. It is the first anti-monopoly law in China. It 
has been viewed as an “economic constitution,”
  Any international IP 
commercialization or anti-monopoly strategy cannot afford to simply ignore 
a nation with such a market.  
11
                                                     
7 IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, PROMOTING COMPETITION AND INNOVATION: WHAT 
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION’S ANTI-TRUST 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 1 (2007), 
 and a “milestone of the 
http://standards.ieee.org/resources/antitrust-
guidelines.pdf. 
8 Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2. 
9 Rill & Schechter, supra note 3, at 783. 
10 CIA – The World Factbook , China, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_ch.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
11 Paul Jones, Licensing in China: The New Anti-Monopoly Law, The Abuse of 
IP Rights and Trade Tensions, XLIII (2) LES NOUVELLES: J. LICENSING 
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country’s efforts in promoting a fair competition market and cracking down 
on monopoly activities.”12
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AML 
  However, the wording of some provisions of the 
AML, including the sections dealing with IP protection, is not very clear. 
Judicial interpretations and implementing regulations on the AML have not 
yet appeared. This has led to a lot of uncertainty for the operations of 
foreign enterprises, particularly IP related enterprises in China.  
¶6 The AML has been widely described by Chinese officials and 
academics as China’s “Economic Constitution.”13 Many believe that the 
AML is a “milestone in Chinese economic policy” and a significant step 
towards a real market economy in China.14 However, some commentators 
believe that the AML may also have a potential negative impact on foreign 
competition in China.15
¶7 Before examining how the AML will affect IP protection in China 
in detail, this iBrief will outline the law. The AML includes fifty-seven 
articles and can be divided into eight chapters: Chapter I–General 
Provisions; Chapter II–Monopoly Agreements; Chapter III–Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position; Chapter IV–Concentration; Chapter V–
Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Powers to Restrict Competition; 
Chapter VI–Investigation of Suspicious Monopoly Behaviors; Chapter VII 
–Legal Liability; and Chapter VIII–Supplementary Provisions.  
  
                                                                                                                       
EXECUTIVES SOC’Y INT’L 106 (June 2008) (stating that the AML is widely 
described by Chinese officials and academics as China’s “Economic 
Constitution”). 
12 Nie Peng, China’s First Anti-monopoly Law Takes Effect, XINHUA NEWS 
AGENCY, Aug. 1, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
08/01/content_8901182.htm. 
13 Jones, supra note 11, at 2. 
14 Richard Student, Note, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Addressing Foreign 
Competitors and Commentators, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 503, 503 (2008). See also 
Liu Ying, BCCC cautiously optimistic over impact on FDI of new Anti-
Monopoly Law, 21 CHINA IP MAGAZINE 1, 
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=401 (stating British 
Chamber of Commerce (BCCC) and the European Chamber of Commerce 
China (EUCCC) feel cautiously optimistic on the potential impacts of the 
Chinese AML). 
15 Student, supra note 14, at 503 (“While the AML is a milestone in Chinese 
economic policy, its substance has been particularly newsworthy for alleged 
weaknesses which may have a negative impact on foreign firms and investors 
doing business in China.”).  
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A. Purpose of AML & Global Concerns 
¶8 Article 1 of the AML sets out the purposes of the law, including: (1) 
preventing and prohibiting monopolistic conduct, (2) protecting fair market 
competition, (3) improving efficiency of economic operation, (4) 
safeguarding consumer and public interests, and (5) promoting the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy. 
¶9 It is clear that the purposes of the AML are quite internationalized 
and reflect global concerns. As some commentators have observed, aside 
from the use of nomenclature in the last provision on socialist market 
economy, “none of these would be out of place in a competition statute 
outside of China.”16 In the process of the law making, the Chinese 
government has widely invited comment and feedback on AML drafts from 
various international stakeholders.17 As Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General of the Anti-Trust Division of the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ), commented, the Chinese government has 
demonstrated its openness to “the ideas and experiences of anti-trust law 
enforcers” worldwide.18
B. Scope of Application 
  
¶10 In addition to covering domestic economic activities, the AML 
covers commercial conduct of certain foreign and international 
enterprises.19 Chapter 1 Article 2 of the AML explicitly states that the new 
law is applicable not only to “monopolistic conduct in economic activities 
within the territory of P.R. China,” but also to “monopolistic conduct 
outside of the territory of P.R. China” if such conduct “results in 
eliminating or restricting” domestic market competition in China.20
                                                     
16 Paul Jones, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: An Economic Constitution for 




17 See id. at 4. 
18 Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks presented to the UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on 
Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice: Some Comments on the Abuse-of-
Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law 2 (July 21, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.pdf). 
19 Daniel Sarvin, China’s Anti-Monopoly Will Have A Broad Impact Beyond 
Notification, Aug. 18, 2008, 
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=7415 (see specifically the 
Extra-Territorial Reach section). 
20 Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 11(1), (2). (2007), available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLa
ws/P020071012533593599575.pdf. 
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¶11 Moreover, the AML explicitly provides that the legislation is “not 
applicable to a business’s lawful conduct in accordance with its legitimate 
IP rights.”21 This placement of IP and anti-trust law in equal position further 
evidences China’s embrace of global concerns.22
C. Enforcement Agencies—Trinity Enforcement Model 
  
¶12 The AML specifies that the State Council shall create two new 
entities to develop and enforce the law, namely: (1) the Anti-Monopoly 
Commission (AMC),23 and (2) the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency 
(AMEA).24
¶13 The AMC does not have substantive enforcement powers. Its 
responsibilities include: formulating competition policies and guidelines, 
evaluating competition conditions, and coordinating enforcement 
activities.
  
25 The State Council of China has already established an AMC at 
the end of July 2008—one week before the AML took effect. 26
¶14 By contrast, the AMEA has strong enforcement powers.
  
27 These 
include the power to inspect and investigate business and non-business 
premises; and the power to obtain relevant evidence, such as seizing 
documents, accounting records, electronic data, and bank account records. 28 
Moreover, the AMEA may even conduct all these enforcement actions 
without a court order. 29
                                                     
21 Id. at art. 55. 
 However, the AML does not detail the structure of 
the AMEA. According to the source close to the law-making process, three 
government agencies, rather than a single body, will be responsible for the 
enforcement of the AML: (1) the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), (2) 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and (3) the 
22 See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. More details on IP-related provisions 
in the AML will be discussed in Part III of this iBrief. 
23 Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 9 (2007). 
24 Id. at art. 10. 
25 Id. at art. 9. 
26 Peng, supra note 12, at ¶ 5. 
27 Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 10, 39. (2007). 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at art. 39. See also Peter J. Wang, H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Yizhe 
Zhang, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, ASIA, 
Oct. 2007, available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S4662 (explaining that 
“[t]he AMC itself is a compromise between the outcry for one unified 
enforcement agency and the maintenance of the existing division of powers 
among different authorities under the State Council”).  
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State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC).30 Each focuses on 
different issues.31
¶15 Under the new structure, MOFCOM is responsible for merger 
review. The NDRC is responsible for monopoly agreements, particularly 
price-fixing issue. The SAIC is responsible for abuses of dominant 
position.
  
32  It will be interesting to see how this trinity model works. Some 
commentators have expressed concerns,33 and believe that the trinity 
enforcement model “creates a complicated institutional framework where 
conflicts are probable.”34
¶16 On July 31, 2008, China announced that its specialized IP courts 
have jurisdiction over anti-monopoly law cases. As many commentators 
have pointed out, “these courts are likely to be better equipped in dealing 




                                                     
30 Peng, supra note 12.  
 This also arguably provides a convenient avenue to 
deal with possible conflicts between IP law and the AML.  
31 See Wang et al., supra note 29 (noting that “many [commentators] view the 
vagueness of these AML provisions as an acknowledgement of the concurrent 
enforcement of the AML by three existing government agencies”). 
32 Dina Kallay, Counsel for I.P. and International Antitrust, U.S. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: An International Antitrust 
Convergence Perspective, Remarks at the Melbourne Law School’s “Unleashing 
the Tiger? Competition Law in China and Hong Kong” Conference 1 (October 
4, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/oia/speeches/081004kallaymelbourne.pdf). Moreover, the 
NDRC completed a draft of the anti-price-monopoly regulations in July 2008, 
which are intended to implement the AML. The SAIC has set up an independent 
bureau in charge of investigation and punishment of unfair competition, 
commercial bribery, smuggling and other cases that break relevant commercial 
laws. See Peng, supra note 12.  
33 China’s anti-monopoly law commission in force, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 
16, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
07/16/content_8553183.htm. See also Peng, supra note 12 (noting that Huang 
Yong, an anti-monopoly consultant at the Ministry of Commerce, said “[i]t is 
hoped that a unified institution comes out in the coming years, which will be 
better in accordance with the country’s situation”). 
34 Adrian Emch, The Antimonopoly Law and Its Structural Shortcomings, 
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL’Y MAG., Aug. 8, 2008, at 2, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1221922. 
35 Peng, supra note 12. 
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D. General Prohibition Provisions—Compared with the European 
Union. 
¶17 Similar to the Treaty of Rome (E.C. Treaty), the AML contains 
three general prohibitions. Chapter II of the AML contains a prohibition on 
“monopoly agreements,” including six types of agreements among 
competing entities (horizontal relationship)36 and three types of agreements 
between entities and their trading partners (vertical relationships).37 The 
chapter also provides a number of exceptions relating to the purposes of the 
agreements.38 Chapter III of the AML provides a prohibition on the abuse of 
a “dominant market position.” It details seven types of acts that abuses 
dominant market position, such as predation, refusal to deal, exclusive 
dealing, tied sales, and price discrimination.39  It also sets out the specific 
factors for determining the dominant market position of an undertaking.40 
Chapter IV of the AML focuses on “concentration activities,” such as (1) a 
business merger, (2) an acquisition of control over other business operators 
via asset or equity purchase, or (3) situations where a business operator 
acquires control or decisive influence over other business operators by 
contract or any other means.41 It set up a “reporting requirement” 
mechanism.42 For any activities that may result in a high concentration of 
business power exceeding the “reporting threshold,” they must be reported 
to the Agency prior to their execution.43
¶18  It is clear that the structure of the AML provisions is similar to the 
E.C. Treaty. Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty focuses on “anti-competition 
treaty,” Article 82 mainly focuses on prohibiting “abuse of a dominant 
position,” and Articles 86 and 87 deal with “concentration.”
 
44
                                                     
36 See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 13 (2007). 
  
37 See id. at art. 14. 
38 See id. at art. 15. More details on these exceptions will be discussed in Part 
IV.B. 
39 See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 17 (2007). 
40 See id. at art. 17–18. 
41 See id. at art. 40. 
42 See id. at art. 39. The AML has not set forth the reporting threshold within the 
law itself, but rather, it provides that the threshold will be prescribed from time 
to time by the State Council. 
43 See id. 
44 See The Treaty Establishing the European Community, Title VI, art. 81, 82, 
86 & 87, (2006) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:
PDF. See also IP/IT Update, Competition Law, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ipit-
update.com/compec.htm (stating “EC law competition law derives from arts. 81 
to 89 of the Treaty of Rome”). 
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II. THE IMPACTS ON IP PROTECTION IN CHINA: APPLIES TO 
"ABUSES" BUT NOT "LEGITIMATE" USES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. Meaning of the Article 55 
¶19 In addition to the above general prohibitions, the AML contains a 
specific provision, Article 55, relating to IP.  It provides: “This Law is not 
applicable to the undertakings which use Intellectual Property Rights 
according to the laws and administrative regulations relevant to intellectual 
property, but is applicable to the undertakings which ‘abuse IP’ and 
‘eliminate or restrict market competition.’”45
¶20 This provision will have a profound implication on the IP protection 
and enforcement in China. For the first time, it sets out the basic 
relationship between the AML and IPRs in China.
 
46 Article 55 implies that 
the laws governing IPRs are considered to be “equivalent in status” to the 
AML.47 It provides IPR holders with a safe harbor for their legitimate 
conducts on exercising their IPRs. So long as the IPR holder complies with 
IP related laws and regulations, the provisions of the AML will not apply.48 
Since it is a general international practice to provide legal immunity for an 
entity’s lawful conduct in accordance with its legitimate IPRs, Article 55 
has been deemed as “further evidence that reflects China’s embrace of 
global concerns.”49  On the other hand, the AML explicitly prevents abuse 
of IPRs. As some commentators observed, although the language of Article 
55 is “very general,” it has clearly presented a concept similar to “patent 
misuse” under U.S. law, which prohibits a patent holder from “seek[ing] to 
leverage its lawful monopoly IP rights to extend them beyond the proper 
scope of the patent.”50
                                                     
45 See Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007). 
 Indeed, as mentioned above, the Chinese regulators 
46 See Jones, supra note 11. 
47 See id. at 3. 
48 Stated differently, Article 55 appears to recognize that the simple exercise of 
IP rights, without more, will not be a violation of the AML. See Masoudi, supra 
note 18, at 9 (commenting on Article 54 of the AML draft, which became 
Article 55 of the AML enacted on August 30, 2008. Masoudi states that“[s]ince 
the right to exclude others from using the invention is the essence of an 
intellectual property right, the unilateral decision of the right holder to exclude 
some or all applicants from using its protected intellectual property is the most 
simple exercise of IP rights and should not be subject to antimonopoly attack as 
an abuse.”). 
49 See Sarvin,  supra note 19.  
50 See Wang et al., supra note 29. The Chinese characters used in the law, 
“lanyong,” can be translated as either “abuse” or “misuse.” 
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did try to incorporate the experience and advice of foreign stakeholders into 
the law-making process of the AML.51
¶21 Although Article 55 reflects global concerns on IP abuses and the 
intersection between IP and Competition law, the language of Article 55 is 
overly general. Consequently, it does not appear to apply directly to the 
interpretation of IPRs, as is the case in the US.
  
52
B. Potential Problems & Legal Risks under Article 55 
 Neither has it provided a 
clear definition of the abuse of the IPR, nor has it detailed potential liability 
for IP abuses. This creates many uncertainties for foreign entities 
(particularly IP-related entities) working in China. 
¶22 The potential legal uncertainty of Article 55 has already been the 
subject of much debate. Generally speaking, there are at least three major 
issues.  
¶23 First, questions have been raised concerning the relationship 
between the general prohibitions of the AML and Article 55.  For example, 
is Article 55 merely designed to clarify the application of the AML in the IP 
context, or does it create a wider prohibition?53  Some commentators 
believe that Article 55 may have extended the scope of the prohibition on 
abusing a dominant market position to activities that non-dominant 
companies carried out in an IP context.54 IPRs do not necessarily confer an 
entity dominant market position. Thus, if Article 55 is interpreted broadly, 
the subject matter of the AML prohibition would arguably not only cover 
entities with dominant positions but also cover entities without dominant 
positions. Using Microsoft’s business operation in China as an example, 
Microsoft often argues that it does not have a dominant market position 
because “genuine Microsoft products have a very low market share in 
China” due to widespread piracies.55
                                                     
51 See Part V. for more examples on this issue. 
  However, if Article 55 is interpreted 
52 The US has not used its antitrust laws to define IP abuse. The US uses special 
legal guidelines to regulate the use of IP licences.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTI-TRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter 1995 
Guidelines]. More details will be discussed in Part IV.C.  
53 See Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.  
54 See id.  See also Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007) (explicitly 
stating that “this Law  … is applicable to the undertakings which abuse IP and 
eliminate or restrict market competition,” and only applies to companies abusing 
a dominant market position”). 
55 Tanya Fong, Microsoft introduce novel piracy defence, ALB LEGAL NEWS, 
Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://au.legalbusinessonline.com/news/breaking-
news/29332/details.aspx (quoting Microsoft Global VP Zhang Yaqin). 
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widely to include non-dominant IP companies, the “test of dominant 
position” may become irrelevant in determining monopolistic actives of IP 
companies.  Consequently, the “piracy defense” alone will not be sufficient 
to provide Microsoft with a safe harbour for monopolistic lawsuits. 
¶24 Secondly, some commentators fear that Article 55 may prevent 
entities from engaging in any abusive activities, such as price discrimination 
and discrimination in IP licensing.56  In other words, some commentators 
believe that the AML may require that similarly favorable licenses be 
granted to any other firms or licensees in the market once an IP licence is 
granted to the original licensee. Some commentators pointed out, by 
requiring IP holders to treat “similar third parties in a similar way,” the 
AML may potentially create a compulsory IP licensing system.57Some 
commentators believe such a system may have significant negative impacts 
on encouraging innovation. The right of IPR holders to refuse to grant a 
license to other firms has been regarded as a “core part” of the exclusive 
rights under the IP laws and is directly tied to “creating incentives for 
innovation.”58  Depriving such a right from IP holders on the ground of 
harming competition may result in a diminution of their investment 
incentives on research and development of IP products, and, in turn, may 
“slow innovation, harming consumers and reducing productivity gains for 
the economy as a whole.”59
¶25 The third concern is about the potential impacts of Article 55 on IP 
infringement proceedings in China. Many multinational companies fear that 
domestic IP companies may use Article 55 to restrain foreign IP holders 
from enforcing their IP against domestic competitors.
 
60  They may attempt 
to avoid or delay infringement actions brought against them by using 
Article 55 as a “defense,” and claim that bringing an infringement action 
against them constitutes an abuse of IPRs or a restriction of market 
competition.  For example, if a company has been accused of patent 
infringement in China, it may claim that the alleged patent is preventing 
competition and then request the AMEA to conduct an anti-monopoly 
investigation—a very time-consuming procedure.  Therefore, some 
commentators believe that the enactment of the AML has paved the way for 
software firms in China to bring anti-trust lawsuits against Microsoft and 
other foreign software companies for their business practices in China.61
                                                     
56 Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.  
 
57 Id.  
58 Masoudi, supra note 18, at 9  It should be noted that the Article 54 of the draft 
AML that Masoudi referred to in his remark is the Article 55 of the AML 
enacted on August 30, 2008. 
59 Id.  
60 Wang et al., supra note 29.  
61 Nicholson & Liu, supra note 2.  
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C. Recent Development of Anti-monopoly Lawsuits and Investigations 
Using Microsoft as an Example 
¶26 On July 31, 2008, one day before the AML took effect, Dong 
Zhengwei, a partner with Beijing-based Zhongyin law firm, submitted a 
document,  “Application and Proposal for Protecting Citizen Property 
Rights,”62 to the AMEA (the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAIC 
respectively), and suggested the AMEA initiate an anti-monopoly 
investigation against Microsoft.63 He alleged that Microsoft was using its 
dominant market position to manipulate software prices in China, and had 
breached Articles 6, 17, and 19 of the AML, which prohibit abuse of market 
dominance.64 He further called for a $1 billion fine for Microsoft’s violation 
of the AML, allowed by Article 47.65 The MOFCOM replied on August 15, 
2008, informing Zhengwei that the application had been transferred to its 
Treaty and Law Division.66
¶27  Microsoft has fought anti-trust disputes around the world for more 
than a decade. Microsoft, the U.S. DOJ and several state governments 
agreed to a settlement in 2001, which required Microsoft to share its 
application programming interfaces with third-party companies, and appoint 
a three-person panel to check compliance with the settlement.
 
67  Although 
some states claimed that the sanctions were inadequate, the U.S. appeals 
court unanimously approved the settlement with the DOJ in 2004.68
                                                     
62 The Chinese title of document is CHINESETEXT 1. 
 
63“CHINESETEXT2” [“Chinese Lawyer applying for an anti-monopoly 
investigation against Microsoft and suggesting impose 1 billion USD fine”], 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, ¶ 17 (Aug. 17, 2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-08/17/content_9424867.htm.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. Article 47 provides: “Where any business operator abuses its dominant 
market status in violation of this Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The 
anti-monopoly authority shall confiscate its illegal gains and impose thereupon a 
fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year.” Anti-Monopoly 
Law (P.R.C.) art. 47 (2007).   
66 Gao, Lingyun & Tan, Xiaolan, CHINESETEXT3, [Civil Lawyer Initiating 
Antitrust Lawsuits Against Microsoft], SOUTHERN CITY DAILY, ¶ 2 (Aug. 20, 
2008), http://sc.stock.cnfol.com/080820/123,1764,4631746,00.shtml 
67 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,860 (D.D.C. 
2002).  
68 Massachusetts ex rel. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). See also, Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel and Corporate 
Sec’y, Microsoft Corp., News Conference Regarding Ruling of U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Antitrust Settlement Remedies 
(June 30, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/bradsmith/06-
30AppealsRuling.mspx) 
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¶28 In Europe, after losing its anti-trust case in 2004, Microsoft has 
been repeatedly fined.69 Furthermore, in February 2008, the European 
Union’s (E.U.) Competition Commission has levied a fine of €899 
million—about $1.35 billion—against Microsoft for failing to comply with 
the European Commission's 2004 anti-trust decision, which mandated 
Microsoft to share interface and protocol information from its workgroup 
systems with third party companies.70 Since the 2004 decision, Microsoft 
has been fined more than $2.4 billion in total by the European 
Commission.71
¶29 In Asia, Microsoft has been pursued for anti-trust violations both in 
Japan and Korea. In July 2004, Japan’s Fair Trade Commission found 
Microsoft in violation of Article 19 of its Antimonopoly Act for provisions 
in its licensing agreement with PC makers that unduly restricted their 
business operations.
 
72 In Korea, the Fair Trade Commission levied a fine of 
$32 million against Microsoft in 2005, and ordered Microsoft to “create 
versions of Windows XP that did not include Windows Media Player and 
Windows Messenger.”73
¶30 If the investigation of the Chinese AMEA (MOFCOM) is 
completed and a lawsuit is filed, China will become the fifth jurisdiction to 
take aim at Microsoft’s business practices, after the U.S., E.U., Japan and 
South Korea.  
 
                                                     
69 On March 24, 2004, the European Commission ruled that Microsoft abused its 
Windows monopoly and fined the company €497.2 million as well as ordering it 
to reveal more of its software code and limiting its bundling of its software into 
Windows XP. See John P. Jennings, Comparing the US and EU Microsoft Anti-
trust Prosecutions: How Level is the Playing Field?, 2 ERASMUS L. & ECON. 
REV., 71, 78–79 (2006).  
70 Geoff Duncan, EU Fines Microsoft $1.35 Billion, DIGITAL TREND, February 
27, 2008, http://news.digitaltrends.com/news-article/15881/eu-fines-microsoft-
1-35-billion. 
71 Gregg Keizer, EU Fines Microsoft Another $1.3B, COMPUTER WORLD, 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
articleId=9065018 (pointing out that “Microsoft had already been fined a total of 
$1.16 billion by the EU in two previous levies, including the original March 
2004 ruling and a 2006 penalty for noncompliance. Including today’s fine, the 
company will have been hit with penalties that total just under $2.5 billion”). 
72 Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Corporation’s Response to the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s Recommendation (July 26, 2004) (available 
at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/Jul04/07-
26JFTCResponsePR.asp). 
73 Gregg Keizer, China Denies Reports of Microsoft Anti-Trust Investigation - 
Microsoft Says It’s “In Compliance” with Chinese Law, COMPUTER WORLD, 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
articleId=9100818. 
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III. STRATEGIES FOR TECHNOLOGY–DRIVEN COMPANIES 
¶31 Given the significance of the AML, any foreign investors and firms 
who are interested in the fast-growing Chinese market need to incorporate 
the requirements of the AML (including Article 55) into their future 
strategic plans.74
A. Non-dominant Position Defence 
  They should also take into account both the opportunities 
and the legal risks and uncertainties brought by the AML.  This iBrief will 
next introduce some defenses that IPR holders may use for potential IP 
abuse lawsuits, and strategies for foreign companies to use the AML to 
acquire a better market position in China.  
¶32 One of most frequently used defenses to monopoly activity is 
arguing non-dominant position based on widespread piracy. As mentioned 
above, when faced with the allegation that Microsoft has abused its 
dominant market position to impose a monopoly price on consumers, 
Microsoft argues that they do not actually have a dominant market position 
due to the high piracy rate in China.75  For example, according to the 
statistics of the Business Software Association (BSA), the software piracy 
rate in China in 2007 was eighty-two percent.76  Microsoft, therefore, 
claimed that it does not have actually power to conduct any monopolistic 
activities such as pricing control because it obviously does not control the 
entire market.77
¶33 As such, unless Article 55 of the AML is interpreted broadly to 
include non-dominant IP companies, IP companies may still use the 
widespread piracy defense against anti-trust challenges.  
  
B. New Exemptions for IP Abuse Claims—Monopoly vs. National 
Development 
¶34 The AML also introduced some new exemptions for companies 
conducting monopolistic activities.  One notable caveat in Chapter 2 of the 
AML is Article 15, which authorizes a competent anti-monopoly authority 
                                                     
74 Sarvin, supra note19.  
75 Fong, supra note 55. 
76 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (BSA), FIFTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL 
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2007), available at 
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/studies/2007_global_piracy_study.pdf. 
See also Press Release, Business Software Alliance, New Study Projects 




77 Fong, supra note 55. 
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to approve exemptions from Articles 13 and 14 if certain monopoly 
agreements among the operators are beneficial to: (1)  improve technology 
or research and develop new products; (2) upgrade product quality, reduce 
costs, improve efficiency, unify product specifications and standards, or 
realize division of work based on specialization; (3) improve operational 
efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium sized entities; 
or (4) serve the public welfare, such as conserving energy, protecting the 
environment, and providing disaster relief.78
 
 
¶35 These provisions are obviously designed to encourage foreign 
investment in research and development and encourage the transfer of new 
technology to China. Many foreign technology-driven companies, such as 
Microsoft, Intel, Google and Dell have made investments in China and are 
expected to continue investing.  As some commentators observed, these 
foreign companies are adopting a long term view that the Chinese 
government will not restrict their business operations in China so long as 
their activities do not conflict with or undermine the development of the 
Chinese economy.79  Thus, they are prepared to “continue to bring their core 
technologies to China and will continue to share and/or license them to 
Chinese domestic companies,” so long as China adopts practical measures 
to improve IP protection.80 Therefore, those technology-driven companies 
(such as Microsoft) may use Article 15 as a potential defense against IP 
abuse claims. For example, they may claim that their business operations in 
China are beneficial to “improv[ing] technology or research and 
develop[ing] new products” as outlined by Article 15(i). Again, Microsoft 
can be used as an example in this case.  Microsoft has set up the China 
Research & Development Group.81  Most recently, in November 2008, 
Microsoft announced that it will invest more than $1 billion on its research 
and development center in China over the next three years.82
                                                     
78 Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 15(1)–(4) (2007) (translated by the author).  
 Thus, 
Microsoft may arguably use Article 15(i) as a defense for any potential IP 
abuse lawsuits in China.  
79 Liu Ying, BCCC Cautiously Optimistic Over Impact on FDI of New Anti-
Monopoly Law,” CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=401(last visited Nov. 
15, 2008). 
80 Id. 
81 See Microsoft Corp., China Research and Development Group, 
http://www.microsoft.com/china/CRD/EN/aboutus.mspx  (last visited Nov. 16, 
2008). 
82 Elaine Hardcastle, Microsoft to spend $1 bln on R&D in China, REUTERS, 
Nov. 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AC2ZV20081113. 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 004 
¶36 However, according to Article 15, all these exemptions are subject 
to approval of a competent anti-monopoly authority. It is still unclear which 
specific agency (MOFCOM, NDRC or SAIC) is the “competent anti-
monopoly authority” under Article 15, and will have a final power to 
determine the availability of the immunity of Article 15 under the AML. 
This creates another uncertainty for AML enforcement. 
C. Opportunities for Consumer and Competitors 
¶37 As important legislation to maintain and improve competition in the 
Chinese market, the AML brings more opportunities than legal risks for 
investors from different countries. It provides an opportunity for foreign 
software companies (such as foreign investment companies owned by the 
E.U., Korea, and Japan) to fairly compete with each other. It also enables 
investors to initiate anti-monopoly investigations and lawsuits against 
monopolistic activities of software giants, such as Microsoft. In doing so, 
the AML helps these companies maintain and expand their market share in 
China. It is clear that a fair competition environment underpinned by the 
AML is good for both domestic companies and foreign investment 
companies.  
¶38 Public consumers will also benefit. Fair competition will provide 
consumers with more affordable prices and more purchase options.83
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHINESE REGULATORS—FUTURE 
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 55  
 This 
may also indirectly contribute to the prevention of piracy because 
consumers will have a legal, real alternative to paying for software from the 
dominant player.  
A. Key Issues & Theoretical Solution 
¶39 Article 55 of the AML explicitly states that the law “is applicable to 
. . .” entities which “[a]buse IP and eliminate or restrict market 
competition.”84
¶40 Regulators can start to answer these questions by drawing on 
lessons from countries with advanced IP and anti-trust laws, such as the 
U.S. and the E.U. It is important to understand how the E.U. and the U.S. 
 Thus, two key questions that future regulators have to 
answer when drafting judicial interpretation regulations are: (1) how to 
define abuse of IP; and (2) how to determine whether a conduct of IPR 
holders, such as restraints of IP licensing arrangements, has eliminated or 
restricted market competition.  
                                                     
83 See also Susan Ness, Preface, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 229, 230 (1999).  
84 Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.), art. 55 (2007). 
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deal with the interrelation between IP protection and enforcement of anti-
trust law. Yale Law School Professor Ward S. Bowman, in his book Patent 
and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal  (1973), has provided 
a clue to deal with this issue. He said: 
“[T]he anti-trust/patent conflict, as courts have assessed it, is to a large 
extent illusory. It is based on a long-accepted but mistaken notion that 
a legal monopoly, a patent may be used as a lever to monopolize the 
unpatented. In addition, courts seem oblivious, whether or not patents 
are involved, to the consumer-benefiting efficiencies derivable from 
agreements sellers make with buyers concerning how, when, where, 
and under what conditions a licensee may use information . . . .” 85
Bowman further listed a number of licensing arrangements that will be 
found “not to be means of creating new and broader monopoly,” such as tie-




¶41 It is clear that Bowman argues that IP rights do not necessarily 
confer market power.  There is no direct conflict between IP laws and anti-
trust law; they share common goals in enhancing innovation and consumer 
welfare. Secondly, most IP licensing agreements (including restraints in IP 
licensing arrangements) are “pro-competitive” rather than “anti-
competitive” in nature.
 
87  It seems that Bowman’s view has now been 
accepted by regulators in both the E.U. and the U.S.88
B. The European Union Model – Block Exemptions 
  
¶42 In order to facilitate the enforcement of anti-trust law in the IP areas 
and strike a sound balance between economic freedom and protection of 
competition, the E.U. enacted its new “Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation” (TTBER) in April 2004.89
                                                     
85 WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW ix (1973). 
  The TTBER prohibits: 
(1) exclusive grant-back obligations of a licensee’s own severable 
86 Id. 
87 Bowman tried to correct at least two common misconceptions the people may 
have in terms of the interrelationship between IP and anti-trust law and the 
nature of IP licensing agreements. People often believe: (1) the 
monopoly/exclusive rights under IP laws will definitely result in monopolistic 
activities of IPR holders in the market, and (2) most of restraints in IP licensing 
arrangements are anticompetitive in nature. 
88 See infra Parts V.B–C. 
89 See Commission Regulation 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 available at  
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:123:0011:0017:EN:P
DF [hereinafter TTBER]. TTBER replaced Commission Regulation 240/96. 
1996 O.J. (L 31) 2.  
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improvements, (2) no-challenge clauses with respect to IP validity, and (3) 
restrictions on the licensee’s ability to exploit its own technology or on its 
ability to develop new technology where the license is granted to a non-
competitor.90
¶43 Moreover, the E.U. noticed that, similar to Bowman’s argument, 
technology licensing agreements “have positive effects that outweigh their 
restrictive effects on competition.”
   
91  Thus, the new regulation is comprised 
of “block exemption” provisions in order to strike a sound balance between 
the IP protection and the protection of competition and to create “an area of 
certainty for most licensing agreements.”92 The EU further enacted a very 
detailed TTBER Guideline to facilitate the implementation of the TTBER 
regulation.93 The Guideline has greatly facilitated the understanding and 
implementation of all provisions in the TTBER.94
C. The US Model—The Rule of Reason Approach 
 Although the AML also 
includes certain similar exemption provisions, such as Article 15, for 
general prohibitions of monopolistic conducts, these provisions are overly 
simplified as compared with the counterparts of the TTBER regulation and 
guideline. 
¶44 In order to improve the certainty of application of IP licensing 
agreements, the U.S. DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly 
published the Anti-trust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property in April 1995 (1995 Guidelines).95
                                                     
90 See TTBER, Art. 5, §§1(a)–(c), 2. See also Jones, supra note 11, at 14 
(providing a summary of core prohibition provisions in TTBER).  
  The Guidelines set up three 
general principles for determining IP-related monopolistic activities, 
reflecting Bowman’s views: (1) the Agencies regard intellectual property as 
being essentially comparable to any other form of property, (2) the 
Agencies do not presume that IP creates market power in the anti-trust 
context, and (3) the Agencies recognize that IP licensing allows firms to 
91 See EUROPA, Technology transfer agreements, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26108_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
92 Id. See also TTBER, Arts 4, §§ 1(c), 2(b). See also Commission Notice 
2004/C 101/08, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0097:0118:EN:P
DF [hereinafter TTBER Guideline]. 
93 See TTBER Guideline, supra note 92. The TTBER Guideline provides very 
detailed instructions on applications of the TTBER and Article 81 (3) of the EC 
Treaty in general.  
94 Id.  
95 1995 Guidelines, supra note 52. 
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combine complementary factors of production and is generally pro-
competitive.  
 
¶45 In line with these principles, the 1995 Guidelines adopted a more 
general approach, the “rule-of-reason” approach, to evaluate restraints in 
licensing arrangements. Put simply, under the “rule of reason” approach, if 
the agencies or courts find a licensing restraint is likely to have both 
anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects, the agencies then have to 
assess whether the “restraint in question” can be expected to contribute to 
an “efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity,” and evaluate 
whether the efficiency-enhancing effects that the restraint may have 
outweigh those anticompetitive effects.96 In doing so, the DOJ attempts to 
strike a sound balance of the “pro-competitive effects of licensing against 
possible anticompetitive effects in related markets.”97
¶46 Furthermore, in order to facilitate implementation of the 1995 
Guidelines and enhance the pro-competitive effects of IP licensing 
arrangements, the DOJ and the FTC issued another joint document - Anti-
trust Enforcement & IPRs: Promoting Innovation and Competition in 2007 
(2007 Report).
  
98 The report re-emphasized the generally pro-competitive 
nature of IP licensing arrangements,99 and reaffirmed the “rule of reason” 
approach set forth in the 1995 Guidelines. Moreover, the 2007 Report 
provides a detailed guideline for agencies and courts to apply the rule of 
reason approach and general principles established in 1995 Guidelines to 
“particular activities involving IPRs.”100 The first two chapters of the 2007 
Report focus on certain methods that an individual IPR holder might 
“employ to maximize the benefits it receives from its IP.”101
                                                     
96 See discussion supra Part III.D.  
 The remaining 
chapters of the report focus directly on four important issues in IP licensing 
practices, including: (1) how to analyze potential competitive harm that 
patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements may cause; (2) how to 
evaluate the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of specific types of 
restrictions in IP licenses, such as non-assertion clauses, grant backs, and 
reach-through royalty agreements; (3) how to evaluate anti-trust 
consequences of tying and bundling of IPRs; and (4) how to evaluate the 
competitive significance of restrictions that attempt to extend the temporal 
97 See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No’s Meet the Nineties, 1997 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON.: MICROECONOMICS 283, 286, available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/ninenono.pdf. 
98 See 2007 Report, supra note 4. 
99 Id. at ch 4.  
100 Id. at 4. 
101 Id. at 5.  
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 004 
reach of patents.102
D. General Recommendations 
  Compared with the 1995 Guidelines, the 2007 Report is 
much more specific, and easier to apply when resolving the IP abuse issues 
in IP licensing practices.  
¶47 Below are some general lessons that the Chinese regulators may 
learn from the U.S. and E.U.: 
1. Forms of Regulations— Special Regulation vs. General Regulations 
¶48 First, in light of proper practice, it is necessary to enact a special 
legal document to regulate the enforcement of the AML law in IP areas. As 
introduced above, due to the complexity of enforcing anti-trust law against 
IP holders, both the E.U. and U.S. have enacted special policy documents 
particularly dealing with IP abuse issues. Thus, the Chinese regulators 
should also enact a special legal document to regulate the enforcement of 
the AML law in IP areas, rather than make a general judicial interpretation 
regulation for the implementation of the AML. 
¶49 Second, it is necessary to enact a specific guideline to facilitate the 
implementation and enforcement of the special legal document. As 
introduced above, in addition to enacting special regulations on how to 
enforce anti-trust law in IP areas, both the E.U. and the U.S. enacted 
specific guidelines to interpret and facilitate the understanding and 
implementation of their special regulations. For example, the 2007 Report 
not only summarized the general principles and approach (the “rule of 
reason” approach) to determine the pro- or anticompetitive nature of IP 
licensing arrangements, but also provided specific examples103 and 
explanations of how to apply these principles to resolve specific issues in IP 
licensing practices (such as tying and bundling of IPRs) and to realize the 




2. Content of Regulation & Guideline—Striking a Sound Balance 
¶50 Future regulations and guidelines should strike a sound balance 
between IP protection and protection of competition. There are various 
ways to realize such a goal. Chinese regulators may consider drawing on 
lessons from both the U.S. and the E.U. approaches and develop their own 
approach which suits the specific situations in China.  
                                                     
102 Id. at 5. 
103 See also the 1995 Guideline, which provided thirteen examples to explain the 
implementation of the Guidelines. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 54 passim. 
104 2007 Report, supra note 4, at 4. 
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¶51 First, future regulators may set up some general principles to clarify 
the complementary relationship between IP protection and anti-trust law.105 
Both IP and anti-trust laws have a common goal in enhancing innovation 
and consumer welfare, such as “bring[ing] new and better technologies, 
products, and services to consumers at lower prices.”106  As the U.S. D.O.J. 
noted, “anti-trust does not protect competition for its own sake; instead, it 
protects competition as a force that leads to increased efficiency, growth, 
and consumer welfare.”107  Thus, the final goal of the IP law and anti-trust 
law is the same in enhancing technological progress and the growth of the 
national economy.108
¶52 Second, future regulators may learn from the E.U., and introduce 
the E.U.-style “block exemption” provisions in future judicial interpretation 
in order to provide the immunity for pro-competitive IP licensing 
arrangements. This will not only help strike a sound balance between 
economic freedom of parties and protection of competition, but will also 
increase the legal certainty of IPR holders using licensing agreements.
  The establishment of these general principles will 
provide important guidance for the courts and the public to understand the 
interrelation between IP protection and anti-trust law, particularly the “pro-
competitive” effects of most IP licensing arrangements. This helps correct 
the common misconception that strong IP protection definitely results in 
market monopoly.   
109
¶53 Third, future regulators may set up a general approach, such as the 
U.S.-style “rule of reason” approach, to evaluate specific IP abuse issues in 
IP licensing practices. Although the U.S. and China may have different 
priorities, similar approaches may be adopted by both countries to evaluate 
the competitive effects of IP licensing agreements. This type of general 
approach will also help to resolve some difficult situations, which may not 
have been addressed in mandatory laws (“block exemption provisions”). In 
other words, the mandatory law and the “rule of reason” approach may 
  
This would arguably create more incentives for IPR holders to invest in 
further innovation. 
                                                     
105 Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Recent Developments in Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
Presentation to the American Conference Institute’s Third Annual In-House 
Counsel Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust 2 ( May 16, 2007) (transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/223390.pdf) (“Antitrust 
and intellectual property laws are complements because both seek to protect and 
encourage innovation and growth.”). 
106 2007 Report, supra note 4, at 1.  
107 Barnett, supra note 105.  
108 See also 2007 Report, supra note 4, at intro. 
109 See EUROPA, supra note 91 (stating the exemption provisions in the new 
guidelines 2004 creates “an area of certainty for most licensing agreements”).  
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work collectively to provide greater legal certainty for both IP holders and 
users.  
3. Enforcement Review Mechanism 
¶54 Sound laws should suit specific situations of a nation. Thus, future 
regulators should always take into account specific social and economic 
circumstances in China, rather than uncritically importing the legislative 
models used in the U.S. and the E.U. Future regulators should bear in mind 
that the final goal of these regulations is to enhance innovation and growth 
of the national economy. Regulators should ensure that the implementation 
of new regulations and guidelines will maintain a sound market and ensure 
that both domestic industries and foreign IP companies operating in China 
have an equal opportunity to participate in both international and domestic 
competition. 
¶55 The Chinese AML was recently enacted, and Chinese courts do not 
have sufficient experience in enforcing the anti-trust laws in IP areas. As 
such, in addition to learning from the enforcement experiences of the EU 
and the US, it would be desirable to set up a three-year review mechanism 
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the prospective IP-anti-trust 
regulations and guidelines in China. Through the review mechanism, the 
Chinese regulators may identify the problems of enforcement and reform 
the law in a timely fashion, making sure that the laws best suit the specific 
social and economic environment in China. 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶56 In conclusion, this iBrief focused on examining possible impacts of 
the Chinese AML on the IP protection and commercialization in China. It 
first provided a brief overview of the AML. It then examined both the 
opportunities and the potential legal risks the AML creates for the business 
operations of foreign IP holders and investors in China. It particularly 
focused on the uncertainty brought by Article 55, and recent developments 
of anti-trust disputes in which Microsoft is a party. The iBrief then provided 
some practical advices and strategies for foreign IP holders/investors to 
operate in China, such as using Article 15 as a defense against potential IP 
abuse lawsuits. Finally, by drawing on the U.S.’s and the E.U.’s experiences 
enforcing anti-trust law in IP areas, it provided some practical suggestions 
for future regulators to better interpret and implement Article 55 of the 
AML.  
¶57 Generally speaking, the promulgation of the AML is an important 
progression of China’s efforts in fighting against monopoly activities and 
promoting competition. Article 55, for the first time, expressly defined the 
role of the IP law in the AML. It reflected a strong intention of the Chinese 
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regulators in striking a sound balance between protecting IP and 
competition. However, the AML, including Article 55’s IP provision, is still 
far from perfect. The lack of detailed implementing regulations and 
guidelines on the interrelation of IP and competition laws has resulted in 
legal uncertainty for both foreign and domestic technological companies 
operating in China. In order to make future regulations strike a better 
balance of protecting IP and competition, China may consider drawing on 
experiences from the US and EU to develop an approach that suits its own 
needs. It is imperative to make mandatory laws (the EU-style block 
exemption provisions), the rule of reason approach (the US-style evaluation 
approach), and national development policy (that is, public interest 
exemptions) work collectively to resolve the IP abuse dilemmas. In doing 
so, provide greater legal certainty for both IPR holders and public users. 
 
 
 
 
